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Introduction 
Whenever Bosnia and Herzegovina´s political issues are discussed, the 
starting point is the Dayton Peace Agreement signed in December 1995 
(Chandler; Bieber 2006). However, already in May 1992 with the beginning of the 
aggression, Bosnia and Herzegovina applied for a special guest status at the 
European Council aiming to prevent human rights abuses as a result of war. 
During the first months of the aggression it became obvious that the Bosniaks 
were systematically executed, expelled and brought to concentration camps. Yet, 
guest status to Bosnia and Herzegovina was not given until January 1994. Finally 
in April 2002 Bosnia and Herzegovina was accepted with full membership to the 
European Council (Solioz 2006 98).  Nonetheless, the Dayton Peace Agreement is 
often seen as the milestone for the relationship between the European Union 
(EU) and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Besides the Presidency of the EU and the European Commission, some EU 
countries such as France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom were already 
involved in the Dayton Peace Agreement and the subsequent creation of the 
Peace Implementation Council (PIC).2 Dealing with the high number of Bosnian 
refugees in EU countries and bringing political stability in the EU region were 
                                               
1 I would like to thank Dr. Ali Gunes and Mustafa Bal for kindly supporting me in publishing this 
article. Furthermore, I am thankful to Dr.Mirsad Karić and Dr.Muhidin Mulalić who reviewed the 
manuscript and offered constructive comments.  
2 The PIC represents 55 countries and agencies that were involved in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement in order to give financial support, provide troops or run directly operations in BiH. 
The London Conference nominated Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United 
Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission and 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference represented by Turkey (OHR General Information).   
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surely the PIC’s main goals (for Germany´s insisting on the question of return in 
Dayton see Bendiek 2004, 89). Since the Dayton Peace Agreement is designed to 
“end a war not to build a state”, as the former OHR High Representative Lord 
Paddy Ashdown (15) contended, it is obviously now the task of the EU ‘to build a 
state’ with solid and stable institutions. This means that the economic, political, 
juridical and civil transition of Bosnia and Herzegovina from communism, 
aggression, ethnic cleansing and genocide to a democratic peaceful state is closely 
linked with its adaptability to be a part of the EU.  
This process evokes usually a variety of questions: Are Bosnian state 
institutions EU-adaptable? What are the main obstacles? How much time will take 
a full membership to the EU? What advantages and disadvantages will Bosnia and 
Herzegovina have with EU membership? 
The resources used for this research paper originate to a great part from 
the internet, starting with documents from the websites of the international 
community: OHR-Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo, European Union, 
Council of the European Union, European Commission in Brussels and in Sarajevo 
as well as the Bosnian Directorate for European Integration (DEI). Few Bosnian 
authors explicitly deal with Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU, such as Nerzuk 
Ćurak, Nikola Kovač, Mirko Pejanović and Emir Hadžikadunić. As far as non-
Bosnian authors are concerned, Florian Bieber, Solveig Richter, Marie-Janine 
Calic, Christophe Solioz, Robert Belloni, Bruno Sergi and Qerim Qerimi as well as 
Graham Timmins and Dejan Jovic delivered relevant contributions. David 
Chandler, though, gives a critical analysis of post-Dayton Bosnia including its 
approach to the EU. Whereas Chandler advocates a less interventionist approach 
by the international community to stabilize democracy other scholars like Richter 
and Calic tend more to the view that the lack of consensus among the political 
elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires a rather strong hand from outside to 
impose the needed constitutional changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and hence 
to clear the path for the EU. As soon as a feasible constitution is set, then the state 
system of Bosnia and Herzegovina has a real chance to start functioning properly.   
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This research analysis will offer mainly a historical overview of the 
relations between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore 
some reconsiderations regarding the above mentioned meta- questions of the 
process are given.  
 
A Prelude to Membership 
As far as the EU in general is concerned, there are three main bodies that 
decide on the enlargement strategy of the EU and thus about the membership of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. They include the European Commission representing 
common EU interests, the European Parliament representing the people of 
Europe, and the Council of the European Union representing national 
governments. Although, the views of individual member states towards the 
integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina differ to great extent3. 
The openness to integrate Bosnia and Herzegovina to the EU is confirmed 
in June 1998 with the “Declaration on Special Relations between EU and BiH”4. 
Thus the primary condition is fulfilled. In terms of membership conditions, the 
1992 Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht, Article 6, says that any 
European state which respects the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law qualifies for EU membership. 
Furthermore, the Copenhagen meeting in 1993 added requirements which new 
members must have achieved before entering the EU. Hence, these Copenhagen 
criteria include: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
                                               
3 This issue cannot be discussed in detail at this point. A critical assessment of British foreign 
policy in the region was provided by Brendan Simms’ Unfinest Hour. Britain and the destruction 
of Bosnia, (London: Penguin 2002); for a comparative perspective stressing also differences 
within the countries Brian C. Rathbun’s Partisan interventions: European party politics and peace 
enforcement in the Balkans, (Ithaca et al.: Cornell University Press 2004).    
4 In comparison to Turkey the EU is reluctant in accepting Turkey as a partly Asian state. The 
openness to integrate BiH to the EU is confirmed in June 1998 with the “Declaration on Special 
Relations between the EU and BiH”. 
EU Enlargement and the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Brief Historical Sketch          102 
 
within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including 
support for the aims of the political, economic and monetary union; furthermore 
a public administration capable of applying and managing EU laws in practice as 
it was underlined by the Madrid European Council in 1995 (European Council in 
Copenhagen. Conclusions of the Presidency).  
1995-1999 Extension of powers of PIC High Representative 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a special case: since World War II genocide and 
concentration camps experienced a repeat on European soil. According to the 
report “Repairing reconstructing reconnecting” from 1998, the EU had to deal 
with 750.000 refugees from war zones while 1.2 million citizens had to flee 
abroad. After signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
had to deal with a complete devastation of the infrastructure, high 
unemployment, displaced people, and a ruined economy. These conditions 
seriously threatened the region’s stability. Consequently, the EU committed itself 
with donations to reconstruct Bosnia and Herzegovina, to provide democracy and 
a viable market economy. The first parliamentary elections held in 1996 were 
seen as the first step towards democracy building in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Since then, four more parliamentary and presidential elections have been held 
(1998, 2000, 2002, 2006; Bieber 2008). Apart from the  DPA -architecture, the EU 
and EC have become strong partners with Bosnia and Herzegovina and cooperate 
intensely with the Office of the High Representative (OHR), United Nations (UN), 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the NATO Stabilization Forces 
(SFOR) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). EU 
governments even insisted that the Office of the High Representative should be 
run by a European representative (Cousens and Cater 46). Chandler states that 
the DPA was made so flexible that it has in fact facilitated external regulation 
rather than restricting it. DPA, as Chandler continues, thus enabled international 
actors to shape and reshape the agenda of post-war transition:  
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Dayton´s flexibility has been the key actor enabling 
external powers to permanently postpone any 
transition to Bosnian ‘ownership’. The only transition 
which has taken place has been from the ad hoc policy-
ownership of self-selected members of the Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC) to direct regulatory 
control under the aegis of the European Union (EU). 
(Chandler 30) 
 
During the first period, 1995-1999, PIC extended the powers of the High 
Representative but with little clear policy direction or end point for the ad hoc 
international administration. PIC was established to provide international 
legitimacy in absence of UN involvement and to include EU and cohere 
international management in the Dayton process. Several PIC meetings such as in 
Florence (June 1996), Paris (November 1996), Sintra (May 1997), and Bonn 
(December 1997) enabled PIC to rewrite its own powers and those of the High 
Representative (OHR). For example, it was decided at the Sintra meeting that 
obstructive Bosnia and Herzegovina representatives may receive visa restrictions 
on travel abroad, and any media network or programme which was 
counterproductive to DPA may be suspended (PIC Sintra Declaration). The so-
called “Bonn powers” are until today often mentioned, especially in everyday 
politics because the High Representative was since then empowered to impose 
legislation giving international officials executive and legislative control over 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (PIC Bonn Conclusions). This included the dismissal of 
elected representatives and government officials who obstruct the 
implementation the DPA. From 1998 to 2005, following the webpage of the Office 
of the High Representative (www.ohr.int), there were in total 117 officials which 
were removed by the High Representative from their respective posts, out of 
which were 48 Serbs, 45 Croats and 24 Bosniaks. Therefore by 1999 the PIC and 
OHR had accumulated an array of powers, particularly the Bonn powers, 
unforeseen in 1995 when Dayton Agreement was signed. 
On the other hand there are disputes and severe doubts on the PDA-
“constitution” which was designed most of all “to end a war” and is not yet 
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functioning properly in respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future as a member 
state of the European Union. The ethnic division of the country even among the 
youth is deeper than ever before and confirms these doubts. Kasim Trnka, a jurist 
and legal scientist, stated that for the past 12 years after the war 279 laws were 
passed. Additionally, 112 laws were imposed by the High Representative. 
Furthermore, 260 bills were discussed in parliament and were not passed. 136 
bills were not approved by the House of Representatives due to entity voting. Out 
of these 136 bills, 20 bills were vetoed by entity voting in Federation and the left 
116 bills were vetoed by entity voting in Republika Srpska (TV debate on BHT1 in 
December 2008). Interestingly, the main objective of the House of Peoples (Upper 
House) is to protect vital national interests. However, only four times since the 
first establishment of Parliament in 1996 constituent peoples have used veto in 
House of Peoples and stopped passing the law. No one of these has been used by 
Serbs - because the Serb national interest can be protected in the House of 
Representatives which is supposed to promote and protect individual rights and 
not national interest of one ethnic group. Consequently, many political actors 
have realized that there is urgent need for constitutional changes. And this has 
even been said by the Parliament of the European Council in 2007: 
 
For the international community, the adoption early on 
in the new legislature of the already agreed 
constitutional amendments remains as the pre-
condition for any serious attempts to embark into the 
more far-reaching reforms which are necessary to 
consolidate the statehood of BiH and its full integration 
in European and Transatlantic  structures. (Council of 
Europe. Information Documents SG/Inf(2006)16final 7 
February 2007) 
 
The “Regional Approach” in 1997 established political and economic 
conditionality for the development of bilateral relations between Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the EU, in terms of trade, financial assistance and economic 
cooperation. Bosnia and Herzegovina´s official approximation towards the 
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membership of the EU, though, started on 8 June 1998. At the Luxemburg Council 
the Declaration on Special Relations between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was adopted and the EU/BiH Consultative Task Force (CTF) established. The aim 
was increasing cooperation and assisting in policy-making in the crucial fields of 
judicial reform, education, media, good governance and economic reform (PIC 
Luxembourg Declaration). Nonetheless, Chandler states: “However, despite an 
increasingly direct EU input into policy-making, the EU played  a subordinate and 
supporting role within PIC Dayton framework rather than dictating its own 
terms” (Chandler 35). Still the DPA was of major importance and the impact of  
the EU was more on civilian level then.  
After the NATO intervention in Kosovo (March 1999) new approaches for 
stabilizing the whole region were required. They were drafted in the Stability 
Pact for South-Eastern Europe, which was agreed in Cologne on 10 June 1999 
between the states of South-Eastern Europe, the EU, the US and Russia 
(http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/constituent.asp).  The idea was to link 
improvement of intraregional cooperation between the countries, with the 
perspective of membership to the European Union – accompanied by political 
and economic conditionality. In the following years the most effective instrument 
became the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which should via a 
subsequent Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) finally pave the way 
for all the countries to full membership. With this perspective and the financial 
assistance of the CARDS Programme, from 2000 on the influence of the EU in the 
region became increasingly greater. 
  
2000-2007 Transformation of external regulative mechanisms  
This period saw within the post-Dayton process a gradual transformation 
of external regulative mechanisms to Bosnian ownership under the leadership of 
the EU. Thereby mechanisms of regulation shifted informally from the PIC to the 
EU, and Dayton became subordinate to the requirements for an eventual EU 
membership.  
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The Road Map announced in March 2000 by EU Commissioner Chris Patten 
was a first step for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP). This document contained 18 conditions which Bosnia and 
Herzegovina had to fulfil beginning with the preparation of a Feasibility Study 
which would set the framework for the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA). These conditions were related to elections, civil service, state institutions, 
border services, judiciary, trade regulations, foreign direct investment, property 
laws and public broadcasting.  
The shift from DPA to EU accession was constantly confirmed on summits 
and meetings.  In June 2000, the Feira European Council declared all South-
Eastern European countries as “potential candidates” for EU membership. The 
Zagreb Summit in November 2000 introduced a Community programme of 
Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) and a 
programme of EU technical assistance for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Final 
Declaration). The CARDS programme supported Bosnia and Herzegovina with € 
240 million (Chandler: 36) focusing on public administration reform (customs 
and taxation), justice and home-affairs (police reform, border management, 
judicial reform) and investment climate (trade, education, environment, 
infrastructure). Furthermore, in 2001 the European Commission adopted a 
Country Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period of 2002-2006.  In 
November 2000, an autonomous preferential customs regime between EU and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted allowing products from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to enter EU duty free. However, statistics of the Foreign Trade 
Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that this policy has increased trade 
deficit in favour of EU and at the cost of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its citizens 
(Pregled uvoza i izvoza BiH-EU 2000-2007). 
The gradual transfer of power from the PIC to the EU became more evident 
in OHR´s 2002 reform when joint actions were adopted for the appointment of an 
EU Special Representative and the launching of the EU Police Mission (EUPM). 
Thus, OHR Lord Paddy Ashdown (2002-2006) became the first EU Special 
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Representative and simultaneously the High Representative. A Board of 
Principles was established chaired by the EU Special Representative as a weekly 
meeting in Sarajevo to coordinate the activities of the OHR with SFOR, OSCE, 
EUPM, UNHCR, EC, World Bank, IMF and UNDP.  OHR´s growing dependence on 
the EU is also indicated by the OHR´s financial contributors. In the current term 
(2008/09) EU provides 53%. Further contributions stem from USA (22%), Japan 
(10%), Russia (4%), Canada (3%) and the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC, 2,5%). However, the OIC does not seem to have any visible influence on 
decision-making process (Office of the High Representative. General 
Information). 
Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the eight month rotation of the Chairman 
of Council of Ministers (CoM) was abolished after the elections in 2002. Since 
then the CoM remained for the whole legislative period (the first was Adnan 
Terzić, 2002-2007), adopting a high level of executive authority and becoming de 
facto Bosnia and Herzegovina’s prime minister. This was important because 
CoM´s task was besides coordinating strategies and policies among state 
institutions, ensuring harmonization Bosnia and Herzegovina’s laws with the 
acquis communautaire of the EU. In April 2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
accepted to the European Council and adopted the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In September that year the “Road Map” was adopted as 
“substantially completed” by the European Commission. Soon the Directorate for 
European Integrations (DEI), founded in early 2003, has become the main 
partner to the EC in the Stabilization and Association Process. DEI has been 
tasked with negotiating and supervising the implementation of further 
agreements made with the EU, especially the Feasibility Study, which should 
estimate its capacity to implement the SAA during 2003.  On the Thessalonica 
Summit in June 2003 the EU committed itself to integrate countries from the 
Western Balkans presenting additional instruments to enhance EU regulation. 
The most important tool were the new “European Partnerships” made to 
strengthen the SAP (Chandler: 36-38). 
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On the basis of the results of the Feasibility Study presented in November 
2003 as the “Report from the Commission to the Council on the preparedness of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement 
with the European Union”, the EU decided in June 2004 for a first “European 
Partnership” with Bosnia and Herzegovina to define the country’s political, 
economic and other priorities preparing SAA negotiations. The Bosnian 
government was expected to respond to this Partnership by working out and 
implementing action plans with a timetable and details of how they intend to 
address the Partnership’s priorities. Particularly, the intensity of EU engagement 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina necessitated the reinforcement of (a) meetings of 
EU/BiH Consultative Task Force to assist in Annual Reports and annual Action 
Plans (established already in 1998) and (b) the Coordination Board for Economic 
Development and EU Integration as the main steering body between the central 
government and the entities.  
The same year, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
reviewed the quality of Bosnia and Herzegovina´s democracy. It demanded the 
strengthening of central state institutions and questioned the extent to which the 
current role of the High Representative is compatible with the membership of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Council of Europe (“Strengthening of democratic 
institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina”). A further step toward the 
empowerment of the EU was the replacement of NATO´s SFOR with EUFOR 
(Althea operation) in December 2004 which meant the end of the UN 
International Police Task Force (IPTF) (Chandler 39). 
The negotiations on SAA between Bosnia and Herzegovina and EU were 
officially opened on 25 November 2005 in Sarajevo. The main stakeholders in 
negotiations were the Directorate General for Enlargement of the European 
Commission headed by Olli Rehn and the DEI, the negotiating team of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, under the leadership of Osman Topčagić. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
domestic problems which are visible through a lack of consensus among the 
elected political elites who represent the three constituent peoples of the country 
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lead to a lack of progress in implementing necessary reforms. Thus it took two 
years to conclude the negotiations on SAA. New instruments of monitoring, 
consultation and steering had to be defined. In 2006, the Consultative Task Force 
(CTF) was re-named Reform Process Monitoring (RPM) to mark the start of a new 
phase in EU-BiH relations, the start of negotiations of a SAA.  A year later the 
CARDS programme was replaced by the Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA) which 
focuses on institution building and socio-economic development. In the end of 
2007, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report was made including the 
Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-2008.  
 
2007 First serious step to EU: SAA 
The informal process of EU regulation became a contractual one when 
Bosnia and Herzegovina initialled the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA) on 4 December 2007. The meaning of that step was then pointed out by 
Dimitris Kourkoulas, Head of Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina: “The SAA is the first step in the EU integration process. It 
confirms that the prospect of EU membership is open for BiH”  (TV Debate 13 Dec 
2007). For the implementation of the agreement the European Commission 
required progress in six key priorities which are (1) ICTY cooperation, (2) police 
reform, (3) establishment of a public self-sustainable broadcaster, (4) public 
administration reform, (5) uniting the entities’ economies to a single economic 
space, and (6) providing conditions for the work of all institutions in terms of 
financing, personnel, equipment. 
After having been signed on 14 June 2008, the agreement becomes 
enforceable when it has been ratified by the Bosnian government, European 
Parliament and the national parliaments of EU members. The adoption of the SAA 
in the Bosnian State Parliament was a prerequisite for its ratification in EU 
countries. In October 2008, the Bosnian State Parliament's House of 
Representatives and the House of Peoples gave their consent for ratification of 
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the SAA. Under the Bosnian Constitution, SAA had still to be ratified by the 
Bosnian State Presidency as well. 
The SAA is an international agreement entailing mutual rights and 
obligations that has precedence over any other law of the country and is seen as 
starting point for further constitutional amendments which are necessary for the 
future normal functioning of the country. The EU Special Representative and the 
executive policy-making institution of the Directorate of European Integration 
maintain full regulatory control over the SAP. For the coming period of 2007 to 
2009 the Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIDP) provided Bosnia 
and Herzegovina with € 226 million in order to realize Bosnia and Herzegovina´s 
development strategy to EU Integration.  
Furthermore, the SAA, if properly implemented, is regarded as the first 
rung on the long path towards the membership of the 27-member bloc. 
Accordingly, Bosnia and Herzegovina has legal obligations in the fields of SAA 
within strict time limits. These necessary conditions are named in the 10 chapters 
of the SAA such as political dialogue, regional cooperation, free movements of 
goods, movement of workers, business plans, provision of services, capital, justice 
and home affairs. These chapters include 1.200 regulations and directives which 
must be gradually transposed from European legislation in order to meet the 
criteria for an EU membership. 
The main advantages of the SAA to Bosnia and Herzegovina are credibility 
building among the international public, establishment of a free trade zone 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and EU which should increase investments and 
employment, better efficiency of institutions, liberalization of a visa regime, and 
democratic-political as well as economic stability in general. Furthermore, the 
struggle against organised crime and corruption is a serious problem to be solved 
since the achievements of these objectives depend to a large part to the country’s 
own political will to align with European standards and values. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s adaptability to the European Union 
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EU interests are strategic in terms of integrating South-Eastern European 
states in EU structure and global in terms of security and peace all over the 
European continent, as the International Commission on the Balkans stressed:  
 
We should clearly bring the region into the EU. Rather 
we need to establish the sequence of policy steps to be 
undertaken and the structure of the incentives that will 
make them work. We need policies so that the region 
can get on, get in and catch up with the rest of Europe. 
(The Balkans in Europe’s Future 9) 
 
The EU is the main trade partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it is visible in the 
regularly updated statistics about Bosnia and Herzegovina and its bilateral trade 
with the EU and trade with the world. In 2007, imports coming from the EU made 
up 66.7% of total imports by Bosnia and Herzegovina, while exports to the EU 
accounted for 71.4% of its total exports. In the same year, EU imports from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina grew by 6.1% year on year to reach over 1.8 billion euros, while 
exports to Bosnia and Herzegovina grew by 8.3%, reaching over 3 billion Euros. 
Exports go mainly to Italy, Germany and Slovenia and imports originate from 
these countries, and to some extent from Austria.  
In terms of reforms toward the EU, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s approach to 
the European Council needs to be included. According to Solioz, until February 
2006, 51 treaties were signed and ratified, 21 treaties were just signed but not 
ratified yet, and there were still 129 treaties neither signed nor ratified. Several 
reports monitoring Bosnia and Herzegovina indicated problems with the 
implementation and with self-responsibility during the realization of reforms 
(Solioz 99-100). On the other hand, Topčagić claims that greatest progress has 
been made in the fields of border management, migration, asylum; internal affairs; 
judiciary through establishing the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the High 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, the Prosecutor’s office of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; establishment of independent regulatory bodies such as the 
Regulatory Communications Agency (Bulja and Subasic 3). This progress was also 
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confirmed by the European Commission in November 2007 (Enlargement Strategy 
and Main Challenges 2007-2008). 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina there are still many internal obstacles and 
challenges to face. The police reform was finally achieved (Richter), but the 
constitutional reform in today’s perspective decides the fate of the present two-
entity structure. While the Bosniak politicians consider the Republika Srpska a 
genocidal creation, Serb politicians threaten with secession from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Croats ask for a tripartite Bosnia and Herzegovina where every 
constituent people has its own federal unit (Loza 1-4). This implies that there is a 
need of a stronger intervention from the EU with a clear vision of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s state configuration when it comes to the constitutional changes. 
The Bosnian constitution set up by the Dayton Peace Agreement established a 
“complicated, non-efficient and expensive state” as Srđan Dizdarević contends 
(90). 
Whereas usually other states spend about 14-16% of the budget for the 
administration, Bosnia and Herzegovina spends 60% of the GDP for its heavy 
administration which has 14 governments and 180 ministers (Dizdarević 90). No 
doubt that this dysfunctional system must be radically changed. The constitution 
is to begin with, it is actually the main obstacle within Bosnia and Herzegovina for 
the development of stable, transparent and efficient democratic institutions. The 
constitutional reform was planned after the local elections are held in October 
2008. As soon as the constitution gets successfully changed to the benefit of a 
sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the adaptability to EU standards is no 
more questionable. 
 
Conclusion and Perspectives 
The European Union is routinely involved in every aspect of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This is also the main critique for the transition work does not go 
towards Bosnian ownership. On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina such as 
all the other former communist countries from East and South-East Europe 
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experienced what it means to live in the world of borders, thinking barriers, 
prohibitions. Therefore the citizens of these countries expect from the EU 
opening up of societies, elimination of all kinds of barriers and obstacles to free 
and unconstrained exchange of ideas, of people, of goods and services, and of 
money. Furthermore with the EU and investments from outside Bosnian citizens 
expect economic prosperity and more employment which should reduce the 
number of youth exodus. Citizens also expect political stability and political 
consensus of governing political powers about character and development of the 
country which will make the return of displaced persons easier and reduce 
nationalist rhetoric to a preference of civil values. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has still to fulfil several conditions, which are 
strategic and institutional, in order to enter EU. Strategic conditions are a stable 
peace, defence of human rights on European standards5, economic renewal, 
return of refugees and displaced persons6, social transition, building democratic 
institutions whereas institutional conditions include a modern and efficient state 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of strategic importance is the membership in NATO´s 
program “Partnership for Peace” in December 2006 which aimed to increase 
peace and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina and decrease national and 
secessionist tensions. The integration into NATO makes a final integration to EU 
more secure. Basically, when talking about integration, it can be concluded that 
integration occurs on three levels: (1) Internal - political, economical, and 
cultural; (2) Regional – Pact of Stability of South-Eastern Europe and (3) 
European- integration to the EU (Pejanović 159).  
When it comes to EU, Timmins and Jović (1) note that:  
 
Although the EU has aspirations to develop a military 
dimension to its external identity, its international 
presence continues to be articulated predominantly 
through soft power, for example, diplomatic, economic 
                                               
5 An extended elaboration of human rights in the EU and BiH can be seen at Sadiković (197-206). 
6 Pejanović argues that it will take 50 more years to realize the return of all displaced people 
according to the actual dynamics (2005 160). 
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and normative foreign policy instruments. The next 
wave of EU enlargement … therefore represents a 
crucial contribution both to the continued creation of a 
stable European order and the credibility of the EU as 
an effective international actor. 
 
Furthermore, there are indications that EU is suffering from an 
enlargement fatigue after the mammoth enlargement in 2004. Hence, next to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina´s internal obstacles, there might be not sufficient will to 
enable the necessary institutional and financial reform that would allow the EU to 
continue to expand its membership (Timmins and Jovic 3). Nonetheless even 
before 2004, the European Council and the European Commission should have 
emphasized more the political dimensions of state-building in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina instead of paying too much attention to technical and administrative 
aspects (Solioz 107). 
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